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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign
inventors, and harmonization of protections. I address the positive question of when countries would want
to treat foreign inventors the same as domestic inventors, and how their incentive to do so depends on
reciprocity. I also investigate an equilibrium in which regional policy makers choose IP policies that serve
regional interests, conditional on each other's policies. I compare these policies with a notion of what is
optimal, and argue that harmonization will involve stronger IP protection than independent choices.
Harmonization can either enhance or reduce global welfare. Levels of public and private R&D spending
will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending
confers on other countries. The more extensive protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are
a partial remedy.
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The economic rationale for intellectual property (IP) is that it encourages
development of new products, and thus generates consumers' surplus. The
net pro¯t that accrues to inventors is also a social bene¯t, since it is a transfer
from consumers. However pro¯t is recognized as a necessary evil, since the
°ip side of pro¯t is deadweight loss. There is no economic rationale for
protecting inventors per se.
This reasoning gets subverted in the international arena. To a trade policy
negotiator, pro¯t earned abroad is unambiguously a good thing, and the
consumers' surplus conferred on foreign consumers does not count at all.
There is a domestic interest in capturing pro¯t abroad, and symmetrically,
there is a domestic interest in trying to ensure that domestic consumers get
access to foreign inventions on competitive terms.
Some commentators (e.g., Hall (2001), Lanjouw and Cockburn (2000)) have
suggested that intellectual property rights in the international arena will be
stronger than optimal because trade negotiators are \captured" by indus-
try. Capture is undoubtedly an important phenomenon, but I argue that
intellectual property policies can be overprotective even without it. This is
because intellectual property is the only available tool by which cross-border
externalities can be recaptured by the innovating country. McCalman (1999)
estimates that the TRIPS provisions would have increased the revenues avail-
able to holders of U.S. patents issued in 1988 by $4.5b, in 1988 dollars. Of
course the domestic interests of regional innovators must be balanced against
the domestic interests of regional consumers; see Maskus (2000a,b) for evi-
dence that national di®erences give rise to di®erent IP policies, and evidence
on how IP policies a®ect trading relationships and foreign direct investment.
1If we conjecture that intellectual property rights are more extensive than
optimal, we must be precise about what is optimal. There are two lines of
thought about this, and they di®er in their assumption about the alterna-
tive to intellectual property. The older literature, which follows Nordhaus
(1969), sees the alternative as a dearth of innovation. It is argued that,
without su±cient intellectual property rights, innovation will be sti°ed, and
consumers will be deprived of innovations. A newer literature, summarized,
for example, by Gallini and Scotchmer (2001), sees a viable alternative in
public sponsorship. Since public sponsorship can avoid proprietary pricing,
there should be a strong presumption that it is a superior way to support
research unless o®set by some other type of ine±ciency. The investigation
below is mostly in that spirit.
In fact, public spending on R&D is huge. The OECD reports1 that in 1999,
only 56% of R&D spending in the European Union was by industry. The
industrial share is higher in the U.S., about 66%, where public spending
on R&D is crowded out by military spending. This is still a considerable
departure from 100%. In Latin America, public sponsorship is dominant.
In 1996 the government shares of R&D spending in Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica and Mexico were substantially over half, while the government shares
in Argentia and Venezuela were respectively 46% and 32%.2
These numbers draw attention to an important aspect of economic e±ciency
in the R&D environment that is often ignored, namely, the mix of private
and public spending. Most investigations of intellectual property policy are
concerned solely with the the private sector.
Public spending on R&D confers externalities abroad, just as private spend-
1www.oecd.org/pdf/M00026000/M00026476.pdf
2www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf00316/secta.htm
2ing does. From a global perspective, optimal public spending would account
for the consumers' surplus that accrues to foreigner consumers as well as
domestic consumers. However a domestic policy maker is unlikely to take
such a comprehensive view. Since cross-border externalities can be partially
reclaimed through intellectual property rights abroad, but not when public
sponsors put their inventions in the public domain, the mix of public and
private R&D spending will be be a®ected by intellectual property treaties.
My inquiry addresses the mix of public and private spending, as well as total
expenditures on R&D.3
Two important provisions of IP treaties are \national treatment of foreign in-
ventors" and \harmonization." \National treatment" means that within each
country, foreign and domestic inventors receive identical treatment, namely,
the treatment of nationals. A secondary question is whether national treat-
ment will be granted unilaterally, or only on condition of reciprocity by the
foreign country. \Harmonization" refers to provisions by which signatory
states agree to a common set of protections. The ¯rst step toward harmo-
nization is usually to state minimum standards, both in the subject matter
protected, and the length of protection.
My ¯rst objective in this paper is to expose the rudimentary incentives to
sign intellectual property treaties, and my second objective is to understand
how intellectual property treaties a®ect the extent of protection. Section 2
presents a short history of intellectual property treaties, with emphasis on
national treatment, reciprocity, and harmonization. Section 3 develops a
simple model to expose the incentives for national treatment. In Sections 4
and 5, I investigate how domestic intellectual property choices are a®ected
3An angle studied by Spencer and Brander (1983), and by Kang (2000a,b) is that
subsidy policy can be used strategically to enhance the competitive position of domes-
tic innovators. Here the role of the public sector is the more straightforward one of
substituting for private incentives, for the direct bene¯t of consumers.
3by treaties that provide for national treatment but no harmonization, versus
treaties with national treatment that also require harmonization. I take an
equilibrium perspective in which each country chooses an IP policy that is a
best response to the incentives provided by other countries. In Section 4, I
assume that, if the private sector has no incentive to invest in a certain type of
innovations, then the public sector will do so if the regional bene¯ts outweigh
the burden on taxpayers. In Section 5, I revisit the same questions under
the more traditional (and easier to analyze) hypothesis that the alternative
to private spending is no investment.
Among my conclusions:
² Independent choices of IP policies can lead to two coordination prob-
lems, one involving asymmetric protections and \free-riding," and the
other involving too little protection.
² Harmonization on minimum protections can also lead to asymmetric
protections, and these may be more e±cient than universal protections,
even if inequitable.
² Harmonization will typically lead to more extensive intellectual prop-
erty rights than independent choices, and may lead to more extensive
intellectual property rights than are optimal, even in the absence of
\capture."
² The aggregate level of R&D spending will typically be too low due to
uncompensated externalities across borders.
² If the alternative to private R&D spending is no investment rather
than public sponsorship, then harmonized intellectual property rights
will be more extensive than if both regions anticipated domestic public
sponsorship.
4There are close parallels between treaty-making for intellectual property and
extraterritoriality issues in competition policy; see, in particular, Guzman
(1998, 2001). Domestic policymakers have less incentive to curb collusion
in an export industry than an import industry, since the burden of high
prices is imposed on foreign consumers, while the pro¯t accrues domestically.
These cross-border externalities are similar to those that arise from regional
intellectual property decisions.
There are also close parallels between treaty-making for intellectual property
and treaty-making on tari® policy. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) have studied
how the provisions in the General Agreement on Tari®s and Trade (GATT)
can remedy ine±cient tari® policies that arise from incentives to protect do-
mestic interests. The premise of their paper is also the premise here: The
policy of each country creates uncompensated externalities abroad, which
might be remedied by treaty. In their case, the policies are tari®s, which
change the terms of trade. The countries' chosen tari®s will not be optimal
because countries do not account for the externalities. Negotiation under
GATT empowers the countries to remedy that problem for the countries'
mutual bene¯t. In contrast, reciprocity will not remedy the ine±ciencies
that arise in choosing intellectual property rights, because the countries do
not negotiate over all the economic decisions that matter. In particular,
they negotiate over intellectual property rights, but not over public R&D
spending. In order to isolate the problem of intellectual property, I assume
that terms-of-trade issues are divorced from negotiations over intellectual
property rights. However my conclusions shed light on why the TRIPS ne-
gotiations were linked to tari® concessions, which allowed small countries to
be strong-armed into signing IP treaties that would otherwise not be in their
interest. For discussions of these negotiations, see, for example, Samuelson
(1999), Watal (1998) and Reichman (1997).
5Several authors have addressed the \North/South\ problem, which is a styl-
ization of asymmetric innovative capacities. One country (North) has the
innovative compacity, and both countries have demand for new products.
The papers have di®ering models, but the lessons in all of them are rooted in
cross-border externalities, as in my own arguments. Inventors in the North
are protected by their domestic IP laws. Through their inventions, they
create bene¯ts for the South. If the Northern inventions are not protected
in the South, then the Southerners get the bene¯t of competitive supply.
If the Southerners grant protection, then they get even more new products
(since the inventors have more global protection), but at proprietary prices.
Deardor® (1992) shows that protection in the South might not be optimal
for either Southerners alone, or for the world as a whole, since the dead-
weight loss in the South might outweigh the worldwide bene¯ts of getting
more inventions. Diwan and Rodrik (1991) characterize how \strongly" the
North and South will protect the Northern inventions, assuming that each
country is motivated only by its domestic interests, and that the countries
do not make treaties. The South may want di®erent products than the
North, for example, drugs for tropical diseases. To elicit investment in those
products by Northerners, they must grant intellectual property protection
in the South, even though such protection undermines the externalities they
get from other inventions of Northerners. In a similar framework, Lai and
Giu (forthcoming) and Grossman and Lai (2001) study harmonization on
the optimal length of protection, the latter building on Helpman (1993), who
introduced complexities such as di®erences in the e±ciency of the manufac-
turing sector. A distortion created by di®ering intellectual property laws is
that production could be shifted to the less e±cient, but more protective,
country. Chin and Grossman (1990) studied a similar environment, but a
di®erent type of intellectual property. In their model, the invention is a cost-
reducing invention, which means that piracy reduces the global price. The
inventor does not appropriate the full rewards of his invention, even in his
6own country, since the product can be produced with the pirated technology
and imported.
A slightly di®erent angle is pursued by Aoki and Prusa (1993), who consider
the e®ect on domestic pro¯t of discriminatory enforcement against foreign
and domestic rivals. They show that asymmetric treatment is not necessarily
in the interest of domestic innovators, and argue that domestic social welfare
is not necessarily higher under an asymmetric policy.
2 A Short History of IP Treaties
The earliest large-scale intellectual property treaties were the Paris Conven-
tion of 1883 on patents and other industrial property, and the Berne Con-
vention of 1886 for literary and artistic works. Under various revisions, these
treaties have remained in e®ect since their inception, and now have more
than 100 members. Both established the idea of national treatment. The
Berne Convention also made the ¯rst e®orts to harmonize protections across
countries, mostly at a procedural level.
For the most part, the principle of national treatment has been maintained
since the Paris and Berne Conventions. Reciprocity is inherent in the treaties:
No country provides national treatment to foreigners in a country that does
not reciprocate. However, reciprocity has recently been made a condition
for national treatment. When the U.S. enacted the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984, the protection of foreign inventors was made con-
ditional on the passage of very similar legislation in the foreign countries.
I n1 9 9 6 ,t h eE u r o p e a nU n i o nr e t a l i a t e dw i t ht h e i rD i r e c t i v eo nD a t a b a s e s ,
which instructs the member states to enact legislation protecting databases
7beyond the protection already a®orded by copyright law. The Directive has a
preamble denying national treatment to non-member states (presumably, the
U.S.) unless the nonmember states also enact such legislation. (See McManis
1996.)
A shortcoming of the Paris and Berne Conventions is that they made no pro-
visions for enforcement. Their modern descendants are administered by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which has very weak en-
forcement powers (Mossingho® 1999, Samuelson 1999). Better enforcement
provisions were introduced in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), as administered by the World Trade Orga-
nization. The latter treaties provide for compulsory third-party arbitration
and other binding procedures.
More importantly for this paper, NAFTA extended national treatment to
all intellectual property, at least on the North American continent. It goes
some distance in harmonizing protections, although not as far as TRIPS.
TRIPS has speci¯c provisions for minimum protection of bioengineered mi-
croorganisms, pharmaceuticals, computer software, and databases, and stip-
ulates minimum durations of protection. Disputes are brought before the
World Trade Organization, which is authorized to carry out very speci¯c
enforcement actions that are widely thought to have teeth.
U.S. history is informative about the politics of IP treaties. The consti-
tutional convention of 1789 was an early instance where a disjointed and
incompatible system of local copyright and patent law was replaced with a
federal system. Each of the 13 founding States ceded its authority in this
area to the newly established federal government. The U.S. did not join the
Berne Convention for reciprocal copyright policy until 1989 because certain
aspects of its substantive and procedural policies were in con°ict with U.S.
8policies. It joined in 1989 because the U.S. had become a major exporter
of copyrighted works, and wanted a voice in the international policy making
process. In the meantime, in the 1950's, the U.S. lobbied for the Universal
Copyright Convention, which, like the Berne Convention, provided for na-
tional treatment, but did not have the same requirements for harmonized
protections, procedures, and length of protection. In the more recent at-
tempts at harmonization, the U.S. has been a leader. This is especially true
of TRIPS, which is the most powerful harmonization treaty to date for both
patentable and copyrightable subject matter, as well as providing a forum
for dispute resolution, the WTO. The U.S. was also very much in favor of
NAFTA. The strengthening of protections abroad under NAFTA and TRIPS
are aligned with American commercial interests.
3 National Treatment
As a warmup, I ¯rst take the protected intellectual property as given in each
country, and consider the incentives to o®er national treatment to foreign-
ers. Suppose there are two countries, a;w. We shall focus on country a,
and sometimes interpret w as \the rest of the world." For i = a;w; let ci
be the aggregate consumers' surplus per innovation, assuming perfect com-
petition, and let mci be the aggregate consumers' surplus per innovation,
assuming that the product is sold by a monopolist. Let ¼ci and dci be the
aggregate pro¯t and deadweight loss per innovation, respectively. The pro¯t
and consumers' surplus are assumed to be the same whether the innovation
is supplied by a domestic ¯rm or foreign ¯rm. By de¯nition, m+¼ +d =1 .
These can be interpreted as present discounted values, and therefore ¼;d will
be larger for longer durations of protection, whereas m will be smaller,
9We use a function ki to represent the total cost of innovations by inventors in
country i: Let (^ ra; ^ rw) be the numbers of proprietary innovations in the two
countries respectively under \autarky", namely, when intellectual property
rights are only available to domestic ¯rms in each country. Let (~ ra; ~ rw)b e
the numbers of innovations when each country grants rights to foreign ¯rms
as well as to domestic ¯rms (\national treatment"). Since national treatment
creates additional incentives for inventors, ~ ra ¸ ^ ra and ~ rw ¸ ^ rw; and that is
all we need to know about incentives for the moment.
O®ering national treatment to foreigners would be a pure gift if its only
e®ect were to allow foreign inventors to pro¯t at the expense of domestic
consumers. The compensation is more foreign inventions, which create ben-
e¯ts for domestic consumers.





a ¡ k(^ r
a)
which includes pro¯t and (monopoly) consumers' surplus plus the consumers'
surplus generated by a competitive supply of the other country's inventions.
The middle term should be understood as an uncompensated externality
from the rest of the world to country a:
Country a would ¯nd it bene¯cial to grant national treatment to inventors
in country w if the following holds.
^ r
ac
a(m + ¼)+^ r
wc
a ¡ k(^ r
a) < ^ r
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a(m + ¼)+~ r
wmc





w > 1=m (2)
If ~ rw is su±ciently large, or if ^ rw is su±ciently small, national treatment of
foreigners will bene¯t consumers in country a. Even though IP privileges for
10foreigners will cause domestic consumers to pay proprietary prices instead
of competitive prices for foreign innovations, the increase in such inventions
may outweigh the loss in consumers' surplus on each invention.
Condition (2) is the relevant one even if inventors in country a already receive
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(3)
which again reduces to (2) (athough the magnitudes of ~ rw; ^ ra will be di®er-
ent). Thus,
Remark 1 (Independent choices about National Treatment )
(i) A country's incentive to grant national treatment to foreign ¯rms does
not depend directly on whether the foreign country also provides such rights.
It depends only on the amount of research that would thus be engendered,
compared to the loss in consumers' surplus on each invention.
(ii) A small open economy will typically not ¯nd it advantageous to grant
national treatment to foreign inventors, although a large economy would do
so.
As described in Section 2, most IP treaties include small, open economies.
This seems to contradict part (ii) of the remark. The key is that regions do
not usually grant national treatment as a unilateral gift, but rather in return
for reciprocity.
If region a's choice is between reciprocal national treatment and autarky, the
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(4)
11A su±cient condition for this inequality is again (2), assuming that the pro¯t
available to domestic ¯rms goes up when pro¯t opportunities abroad are
added (^ raca¼ ¡ k(^ ra) < ~ ra¼(ca + cw) ¡ k(~ ra)). If the additional pro¯t is
substantial, the inequality (4) may hold even if (2) does not hold.
This argument can be expanded to shed light on why reciprocity might over-
turn the instability pointed to in Remark 1(ii). Instead of interpreting w as
a single other country, assume that it is an amalgamation of many countries,
each more or less the size of a: Consider the experiment that country a
unilaterally withdraws from a multilateral reciprocal agreement for national
treatment. Assuming that the agreements among all the other countries
remain intact, and that a is relatively small, their R&D incentives will not
change very much. That is, ^ rw » = ~ rw: In that case, the inequality (2) will
not hold, but (4) may nevertheless hold if there is a large enough impact on
domestic innovation and domestic pro¯t in a. With reciprocity, the incentive
for a small country to stay in a multilateral agreement is pro¯t driven. In
particular, if the di®erence between ^ raca¼¡k(^ ra)a n d~ ra¼(ca+cw)¡k(~ ra)i s
large enough, then country a will remain in the agreement despite the oppor-
tunity to free ride on foreign inventions, in order to gain access to pro¯t in the
large world market. Even this incentive may fail, and then the country must
be induced to participate by granting additional concessions such as trade
concessions and membership in the WTO (see Lai and Giu (forthcoming)).
It is straightforward that if the countries agree to reciprocal national treat-
ment, then the agreement enhances social welfare. And if the agreement
would decrease social welfare, at least one of the countries would oppose
it.4 Further, reciprocal national treatment can only be in the interest of all
countries if it increases innovation substantially. Without an increase in inno-
4Compare with the conclusions of Deardor® (1992). Deardor® showed that reciprocity
can decrease social welfare, but did not ask whether the countries would agree to it.
12vation, each country sees two e®ects: a change in pro¯t °ow among countries,
and deadweight loss on foreign inventions. In aggregate, the pro¯t °ows are
transfers; except in the case of complete symmetry, at least one country is a
net winner and at least one other is a net loser. However the deadweight loss
is \real." This implies that, without an o®setting bene¯t of more innovations,
t h e r em u s tb ea tl e a s to n en e tl o s e r .
Remark 2 (Reciprocal National Treatment)
(i) If a country has incentive to provide national treatment to foreign in-
ventors in the absence of reciprocity, then it would also favor a reciprocal
agreement to do so.
(ii) A country may agree to a reciprocal agreement in circumstances where
the country would not unilaterally grant national treatment to foreigners.
(iii) Unless reciprocal national treatment leads to more proprietary innova-
tions and higher social welfare than autarky, at least one country will oppose
it.
(iv) A federation of \small" nations might agree to a multilateral recipro-
cal agreement for national treatment even if none would unilaterally grant
national treatment.
Remark 1(ii) should be compared with Remark 2(iv). Remark 1(ii) implies
that a small country will not want to provide national treatment if its rights
abroad do not depend on it. Remark 2(iv) points out that by making the
rights abroad contingent on reciprocity, the small country might be kept from
defecting, despite the opportunity to free-ride on a large number of foreign
inventions.
Remark 2 tells us that e±ciency is enhanced by making treaties for reciprocial
IP privileges. However the notion of e±ciency in Remark 2 is restricted, since
13it takes as given the levels of protection in each country. In the next sections
I investigate how these agreements a®ect the extent of the protections that
will be provided. The original Paris and Berne Conventions speci¯ed neither
the subject matters that would be protected nor, for the most part, the policy
levers that a®ect pro¯tability, such as the length and breadth of rights, and
exceptions for fair use or public purposes. It is possible to harmonize all
these policy levers, and, indeed, TRIPS addressed the issue of length (see
Grossman and Lai (2001)). However the main points of controversy in the
TRIPS negotiation concerned subject matter itself, rather than the policy
levers. For example, there was substantial controversy over the protection of
bioengineered life forms, computer software, and data products. The model
that follows is oriented toward harmonization on subject matter, assuming
that the policy levers are of secondary importance, at least within the range
of possibilities under discussion.
4 Global E±ciency
If there were no social advantage in delegating R&D to private ¯rms, and
if there were no uncompensated externalities across borders, the ¯rst-best
policy would be public support of all R&D, which would avoid deadweight
loss. However, even aside from the distributional issues that undermine the
willingness to pay for public investments that bene¯t all consumers globally,
there are at least two possible advantages to private investments. One is
that public sponsors are less good at satisfying consumer preferences, and
the other is that private sponsors are more e±cient. In this model I shall
assume the latter.
Instead of introducing heterogeneity in the value of innovations, I maintain
14the market structure above for each innovation, and index \subject matter"
by cost. I assume that the cost of subject matter x 2 [0;1]i sx if provided by
the private sector under intellectual property incentives, and is kx if provided
by the public sector, where k>1. Thus, the innovations are ordered so that
the cost advantage of the private sector, (k ¡ 1)x,i si n c r e a s i n gi nx.
In this section I discuss ¯rst-best e±ciency in the organization of intellectual
property rights (assuming that the duration of protection is ¯xed). In the
e±ciency analysis there are two considerations: which investments should
be undertaken, and how should they be funded. The two options are public
sponsorship and intellectual property. I will say that the system of intel-
lectual property protection and public sponsorship is globally e±cient if it
maximizes worldwide consumers' surplus without regard to distribution.
The e±cient intellectual property regime is described in Table I below. It is
important to realize that the considerations in Table 1 will not be re°ected in
any administrator's objective function. For example, from a global perspec-
tive, public sponsorship is more e±cient than intellectual property whenever
(k ¡ 1)x is less than d(ca + cw). But this will not be a decision criterion of
either region.





(k¡1) < (¼ca, ¼cw) <
d(ca+cw)
(k¡1) <¼ (ca + cw) <
(ca+cw)
k :
It is clear how to modify the table if these relationships do not hold.
Table I: Global E±ciency
15subject matter (cost) intellectual property?
x 2 [0; dca
(k¡1)) public sponsorship in a and w
x 2 [ dca
(k¡1);¼c a)I P i n a, public sponsorship in w
x 2 [¼ca;¼c w)I P i n w, public sponsorship in a
x 2 [¼cw;
d(ca+cw)
(k¡1) ) public sponsorship in a and w
x 2 [
d(ca+cw)
(k¡1) ;¼(ca + cw)) IP in a and w
x 2 [¼(ca + cw);
(ca+cw)
k ) public sponsorship in a and w
An e±cient regime may provide for intellectual property in only a single
region, in particular, for the less costly innovations. Granting rights in only
a single market imposes less deadweight loss. However, costly innovations
may require pro¯ts in both markets.
Three types of subject matter should not be protected: (1) innovations whose
cost is relatively low, so that the cost e±ciency of the private sector does not
outweigh the deadweight loss even in a single market, (2) high-cost subject
m a t t e rf o rw h i c hc o s tc a n n o tb ec o v e r e db yr e v e n u ee v e ni nb o t hm a r k e t s ,
and (3) innovations whose cost cannot be covered in a single market, but for
which the deadweight loss in both markets would be more burdensome than
the ine±ciency of public sponsorship.
The distributional issues ignored in Table 1 become key in the equilibrium
analysis below. Neither region wants to be the sole provider of intellectual
property rights, because their consumers bear all the deadweight loss, while
their innovators and public sponsors confer uncompensated externalities on
the other region. A region would always want to have its own intellectual
property reciprocated abroad, so that it can recoup part of the externality it
confers, as pro¯t.
165 IP and Public Sponsorship
It seems unlikely that an intellectual property policy such as the one in
Table 1 would be implemented. There will be con°icts, since asymmetric
protections create one-way externalities. Nevertheless, I show that certain
important features of the Table, such as unilateral protection for some subject
matters, may emerge.
I assume that domestic policy makers will respect a notion of social value that
accounts for all the domestic interests, including those of domestic consumers
and domestic inventors. Pro¯t earned abroad enters the social calculus
through the interests of domestic inventors.
If an invention (subject matter) is not supplied by the private sector, then
I assume it will be supplied by the public sector if its regional social value
outweighs its cost. An invention that is publicly sponsored by either region
can be competitively supplied in all regions, since it enters the public domain.
Thus if a subject matter is protected in one region but not another, the
innovations will be public in some regions, but not in others. Whether an
invention is public or private in a particular region depends on the intellectual
property law in that region, and not on where the inventor is domiciled.
Let °a;°w 2 R+ measure the two regions' innovativeness. °i represents the
number of innovations on a unit of the real line. Investment in jurisdiction
i along an interval [0;fi] results in a total of °ifi innovations, at total cost
°ik
R fi
0 xdx if undertaken by the public sector. Investment in the interval
[fi;¼(ca + cw)] results in °i[¼(ca + cw) ¡ fi] innovations, with total cost
R ¼(ca+cw)
fi xdx if undertaken by the private sector.
I shall now investigate how protections are chosen in equilibrium under var-
17ious treaty rules, and compare with the optimal policy described in Table 1,
which accounts for all the externalities.
Consider a treaty that provides for national treatment of foreign inventors,
but each region chooses the extent of its protections independently of the
other, as in the original Paris Convention.
Equilibrium with independent choices may be asymmetric in its intellectual
property regimes, even if the regions are identical. To see why this is true,
suppose instead that both protect the same subject matters. Suppose, how-
ever, that a single market, say a, is lucrative enough to cover R&D costs
for inventions in either region. Then the rest of the world, w,c a nw e a k e n
its protection without jeopardizing innovation, even by its own innovators.
Its own innovators can still get protection in the lucrative market a, but
consumers in w get these innovations at competitive prices.
The argument relies on national treatment, by which each jurisdiction grants
the same rights to all ¯rms, regardless of where they are domiciled. With
national treatment, a ¯rm's incentive to invent does not depend on where it is
domiciled, even if regions have di®erent intellectual property regimes. A ¯rm
in a region with low protection can patent in the region with high protection.
Thus, if one of the regions has relatively high protections, the other region
can exploit that fact by granting low protection. Low protection allows its
own consumers to bene¯t from competitive supply, and national treatment
allows its ¯rms to pro¯t from their inventions by marketing them abroad. As
a consequence, for some parameter values, there is an equilibrium with high
protection in one region and low protection in the other. In fact, this may
be the only equilibrium.
In order to study the equilibria, we must specify the regions' payo® functions.
18A simplifying aspect is that a region's choice whether to protect a given
subject matter x can be cleaved o® from its choices about other subject
matters. Thus, we can think of each region's strategy in terms of individual
decisions about individual subject matters. The strategies shall be functions
Pi :[ 0 ;1] !f 0;1g,w h e r ePi(x) = 1 means that subject matter with cost x
is protected in region i:
The following functions, each on [0;¼(ca + cw)]; are useful in de¯ning the
regions' objective functions. Da (symmetrically, Dw) is the amount by
which region a would be better o® providing unilateral intellectual prop-
erty rather than relying on public sponsorship. The regional social bene¯t
with unilateral IP is (1 ¡ d ¡ ¼)ca(°a + °w)+ ¼ca°a ¡°ax: The regional
social bene¯t with public sponsorship is ca(°a +°w)¡ k°ax: The di®erence
is Da(x): ~ Da (symmetrically, ~ Dw) is the amount by which region a would be
better o® with bilateral intellectual property rather than public sponsorship
in both regions. With bilateral intellectual property, region a's net bene¯t
is (1¡d¡¼)ca(°a +°w)+ ¼(ca +cw)°a ¡°ax: With public sponsorship, the
net regional bene¯t is ca(°a + °w) ¡ k°ax: The di®erence is ~ Da(x):
Da(x)=¡ca°w(d + ¼) ¡ ca°ad +( k ¡ 1)°ax
~ Da(x)=¡ca°w(d + ¼) ¡ ca°ad + ¼°acw +( k ¡ 1)°ax
Dw(x)=¡cw°a(d + ¼) ¡ cw°wd +( k ¡ 1)°wx
~ Dw(x)=¡cw°a(d + ¼) ¡ cw°wd + ¼°wca +( k ¡ 1)°wx
A subject matter x will be publicly supported instead of abandoned in the
absence of intellectual property right if
c
a ¸ kx
We will assume for simplicity that this condition holds whenever x · ¼ca;
and symmetrically for w:
Because of the binary nature of strategies, it is easiest to de¯ne the objec-
19tive function ¦a (symmetrically, ¦w) as the di®erence in payo® to region a
between providing protection and not providing it, times the value of the
strategy. Thus Pa(x) = 1 maximizes the payo® di®erence if the di®erence is
nonnegative, and Pa(x) = 0 is optimal otherwise. The payo® function of a
(symmetrically, w)i sa sf o l l o w s .
¦a(Pa(x);Pw(x)) =
Pa(x) £ Da(x)i f Pw(x)=0 ;x· ¼ca
Pa(x) £ 0i f Pw(x)=0 ;x>¼ c a
Pa(x)i f Pw(x)=1 ;x· ¼cw
£ [¡ca°ad ¡ ca°w(d + ¼)]
Pa(x) £ ~ Da(x)i f Pw(x)=1 ;
¼(ca + cw) ¸ x>¼ c w
An equilibrium with independent choices is a pair (Pa;P w) such that at
each x 2 [0;1];P a(x) 2 argmaxf¦a(Pa;Pw(x))jPa 2f 0;1gg and Pw(x) 2
arg maxf¦w(Pw;Pa(x))jPw 2f 0;1gg: We adopt the convention that if the
region is indi®erent between providing protection or not, it chooses Pi(x)=0
(does not provide protection).
Let
x
a =m a x fx 2 R+ j Da(x) · 0g (5)
x














A characterization of equilibrium follows. For a clean statement of the
proposition, I assume that ¼ca · ¼cw and xa · xw: It should be clear how
to revise the conclusions for the other cases, by substituting minfxa;x wg for
xa,m a x fxa;x wg for xw,m i n f¼ca;¼c wg for ¼ca; maxf¼ca;¼c wg for ¼cw:
20Proposition 3 (Independent Choices: Existence and Characterization) An
equilibrium with independent choices exists, and must have the following prop-
erties: For xa;x w and f de¯ned in (5) and (6), the following is a complete
characterization of equilibrium.
(a) For each x 2 [0;x a);P a(x)=Pw(x)=0 :
(b) For each x 2 [xa;x w);P a(x)=1 ;P w(x)=0 :
(c) For each x 2 [xw;¼c a),e i t h e r( Pa(x)=1 ;P w(x)=0 )or vice versa.
(d) For each x 2 [¼ca;¼c w);P w(x)=1, Pa(x)=0 .
(e) For each x 2 [¼cw;f);P a(x)=Pw(x)=0 .
(f) If f · ¼(ca +cw); for each x 2 [f;¼(ca +cw)); either Pa(x)=Pw(x)=0
or Pa(x)=Pw(x)=1 :
(g) For each x>¼ (ca + cw), Pa(x)=Pw(x)=0 :
Public sponsors will provide the very low-cost subject matters described in
part (a), since public expenditure is not very ine±cient. Investments that are
too costly to be protected by a single jurisdiction, but not costly enough to
justify deadweight loss in two regions, will also be publicly sponsored (part
(e)). And innovations with cost so high that not even protection in two
regions can cover it will also be publicly sponsored (part (g)), provided the
subject matter satis¯es x ·
ci
k :
Parts (b), (c) and (d) describe subject matters for which, in equilibrium,
inventions might be protected in only one region, which is su±cient to cover
the costs of invention. The other region can free-ride, bene¯tting from com-
petitive supply of the innovations, and allowing its own innovators to cover
their cost by selling at proprietary prices abroad. It is important to notice
that there can be multiple equilibria in the region described by (c), where
either region can be the one that unilaterally provides protection. There is
no reason to think that, in equilibrium, the region providing unilateral pro-
tection will be the one that minimizes deadeweight loss. In (b) and (d), only
21one region has an incentive to do so.
Proposition 3 points to multiple equilibria in at least two ways, resulting
from coordination problems. First, for low-cost subject matters which only
warrant protection in a single region, there may be an indeterminacy as to
which region protects it. In the domain described by (c), either region may
protect the subject matter, and the other has incentive not to. Further, for
subject matters with cost large enough that unilateral protection is ine®ec-
tive, there is a di®erent coordination problem. If neither region is protecting
the subject matter, unilateral action cannot break the impasse. The regions
can get stuck in a situation where neither protects it, even though they might
both be better o® providing protection.
Before considering harmonization, I point out the ways in which indendent
choices depart from the optimal choices described in Table I.
Proposition 4 [(In)e±ciency of Equilibrium with Independent Choices] An
equilibrium with independent choices (Pa;P w) has the following properties:
(a) (E±ciency of unilateral protection) If either region grants unilateral pro-
tection (e.g., Pa(x)=1 ;P w(x)=0 ), then unilateral protection is more e±-
cient than public sponsorship. However it may hold that Pa(x)=1 ;P w(x)=0
when Pa(x)=0 ;P w(x)=1w o u l db em o r ee ± c i e n t .
(b) (E±ciency of bilateral protection) If both regions grant simultaneous
protection (Pa(x)=Pw(x)=1 ) , then bilateral protection is more e±cient
than public sponsorship, and unilateral protection would be ine®ective.
(c) (Too little protection) If neither region grants protection (Pa(x)=Pw(x)
=0 ) then it could nevertheless hold that either unilateral protection or bilat-
eral protection would be more e±cient than public sponsorship.
22Proof: (a) Pa(x)=1 ;P w(x)=0i m p l yDa(x) ¸ 0, which implies dca <
(k ¡ 1)x. However, by Proposition 3(c), if x · maxf¼ca;¼c wg; nothing
guarantees that it is the market with smaller deadweight loss where protec-
tion is provided. (b) Pa(x)=Pw(x)=1i m p l yt h a t~ Da(x); ~ Dw(x) ¸ 0,
which jointly imply that d(ca + cw) < (k ¡ 1)x: By Proposition 3(a)-(d), if
x · maxf¼ca;¼c wg; only one region will protect the subject matter, hence
the hypothesis Pa(x)=Pw(x)=1i m p l i e st h a tx>maxf¼ca;¼c wg; so that
unilateral protection would be ine®ective. (c) Nothing in Proposition 3 ex-
cludes that x · maxf¼ca;¼c wg;D a(x);D w(x) < 0( s oPa(x)=Pw(x)=0 )
and dca <k x : Nothing excludes that x>¼ c a;¼c w, ~ Da(x) < 0 < ~ Dw(x); and
d(ca + cw) < (k ¡ 1)x: ¤
Regarding part (c), a region will resist unilateral protection, even when it
would be e±cient, because unilateral protection creates an out°ow of pro¯t
from domestic consumers to foreign inventors. The out°ow of pro¯t is a
transfer, which nets to zero in the global e±ciency calculation, but is one of
the regional policy maker's decision criteria.
Bilateral protection might also be stymied due to the transfers of pro¯t.
Each region both gives and receives transfers that, in aggregate, sum to zero.
The domestic region pays pro¯ts to foreign inventors, and receives pro¯ts
from foreign consumers. If bilateral protection is stymied, it is because one
region would be a large net payer of pro¯ts, and the other would be a large
net receiver of pro¯ts, and the discrepancy is large enough to overcome the
cost advantages of private investment. Whether a region is a net payer or
net receiver depends on the relative sizes of the markets, and on the regions'
relative productivity, as remarked below.
We now turn to harmonization. Under a system of harmonized national
treatment, the regions must agree on a common set of minimum protections.
23Regions can increase their protections, but cannot reduce them. The re-
gions' preferred harmonized policies { the ones they would lobby for { are
not the same as the ones they would choose in an equilibrium with indepen-
dent choices. This is because an increase in harmonized protection has a
bene¯t for the region that a unilateral strengthening of protection does not;
it supposes a reciprocal strengthening of protections abroad, which allows
the region to collect additional pro¯t.
In order to have a preference on whether the regions should harmonize on
protecting a given subject matter, each region must have a prediction as to
what would happen otherwise. What would happen is described in Propo-
sition 3, since the independent choices for each x are independent of the
choices for any other subject matter. Since, by Proposition 3, there can be
multiple equilibria, the preferences about harmonization will re°ect a speci¯c
anticipated alternative, say (Pa;P w):





k ¸ maxf¼ca;¼c wg:
Lemma 5 Assume that ¼ca · ¼cw; and let (Pa;P w) be an anticipated equi-
librium with independent choices. Region a (symmetrically, w)p r e f e r st o
harmonize on subject matter x if and only if ~ Da(x) ¸ 0 and one of the fol-
lowing holds:
(a) x ¸ ¼cw
(b) x 2 [0;¼c w) and Pa(x)=1 ;P w(x)=0 :
(c) x 2 [0;¼c w);P a(x)=Pw(x)=0 :
Proof: ( I f ) F o ra n ys u b j e c tm a t t e rf o rw h i c h ~ Da(x) ¸ 0,i tm a yo rm a y
not be the case that x ¸
ca
k ; that is, it may or may not be the case that the
24alternative to harmonization is public sponsorship rather than no investment.
However ~ Da(x) ¸ 0 implies that region a prefers harmonized protection to
either, provided the alternative is not unilateral protection by region w.T h e
three circumstances (a), (b) and (c) eliminate that possibility.
(Only if) Region a prefers harmonization only if bilateral protection is better
than public sponsorship ( ~ Da(x) ¸ 0) and unilateral protection in region w is
not a viable alternative. These circumstances are eliminated by (a), (b), (c).
¤
Remark 6 Assume that bilateral protection for subject matter x is e±cient.
If region a is su±ciently more innovative than w; or if the market in w is
large enough (that is, if
°a
°w or cw is su±ciently large), region a will favor
harmonization on x,a n dr e g i o nw will oppose it.

















a)+( k ¡ 1)
°w
°a x:
The e±ciency of bilateral protection is equivalent to ~ Da(x)+ ~ Dw(x) ¸ 0:
But for either
°w
°a su±ciently small or cw su±ciently large, ~ Dw(x) < 0; which
means that region w will oppose bilateral protection. It must therefore hold
that ~ Da(x) > 0; which means that region a will favor it.
We now come to the question of whether harmonization strengthens pro-
t e c t i o n so v e rw h a tw o u l dh a p p e no t h e r w i s e . A ni m p o r t a n ti m p l i c a t i o no f
Lemma 5 is that the two regions will disagree sharply on subject matters
which would otherwise be protected in only one region. Region a wants
25to harmonize on subject matter that would otherwise only be protected in
region a, and region w w a n t st oh a r m o n i z eo ns u b j e c tm a t t e rt h a tw o u l d
otherwise only be protected in region w: In general they will also disagree on
some subject matters that require joint protection in order to be e®ective.
But for many such subject matters, they will agree, in particular for any
subject matter with cost greater than f d e ¯ n e di n( 6 ) ,s i n c ex ¸ f holds if
and only if both ~ Da(x) ¸ 0a n d ~ Dw(f) ¸ 0:
We shall de¯ne a most protective equilibrium as one in which every subject
matter x ¸ f is protected in an equilibrium with independent choices, and
each subject matter with x · maxf¼ca;¼c wg is protected by a single jurisdic-
tion. In Proposition 7, when we say that the regions anticipate a particular
equilibrium with independent choices, we mean with respect to those subject
matters for which there has been no agreement to harmonize.
We can consider various rules for resolving disputes, each with the prop-
erty that, if the regions agree on harmonization, they will implement their
agreement.
(i) Nonprotectionist Rule: If the regions disagree on a particular subject
matter, there will be no agreement to jointly protect it.
(ii) Protectionist Rule: If the regions disagree on a particular subject matter,
there will be an agreement to jointly protect it.
(iii) Bargaining Solution: If the regions disagree on a particular subject
matter it will be jointly protected with positive probability.
Proposition 7 (Comparison of Harmonization and Independent Choices) If
the regions anticipate any equilibrium other than the most protective one, then
26harmonization will lead to stronger intellectual property protection than an
equilibrium with independent choices, under any of the disagreement rules (i),
(ii) or (iii). The most protective equilibrium may have the same protections.
Proof: Consider ¯rst the Nonprotectionist Rule. Since subject matters
with cost less than maxf¼ca;¼c wg are never protected bilaterally in the equi-
librium with independent choices, harmonization can only strengthen protec-
tions there. If there is no agreement to harmonize, then the same protec-
tions will arise as in the alternative equilibrium. However if the conditions
of Lemma 5(c) hold and ~ Da(x); ~ Dw(x) ¸ 0 even though Pa(x)=Pw(x)=0 ;
harmonization may strengthen protections for such subject matters. Subject
matters with cost greater than maxf¼ca;¼c wg are either protected bilaterally
or not at all in the alternative equilibrium: Referring to Proposition 3(f),
if Pa(x)=Pw(x) = 1 for such a subject matter, then harmonization has no
e®ect. But if Pa(x)=Pw(x)=0 ; then harmonization strengthens protec-
tions. Under this rule, harmonization can increase protections because it
can solve a coordination problem between the regions.
Since there can only be more protection under the Protectionist Rule and
Bargaining Rule than under the Nonprotectionist Rule, harmonization can
only increase protections. ¤
Proposition 8 (Welfare E®ects of Harmonization) When the alternative to
intellectual property is public sponsorship, the welfare e®ects of harmoniza-
tion are ambiguous:
(a) Under the Nonprotectionist rule, the regions will never harmonize on a
subject matter for which bilateral public sponsorship would be more e±cient.
Under the Protectionist rule and Bargaining Solution they may do so.
(b) Under any of the disagreement rules, harmonization can lead to bilateral
protection where unilateral protection would be more e±cient.
27Proof: (a) If ~ Da(x) ¸ 0; ~ Dw(x) ¸ 0; then
d(ca+cw)
(k¡1) · x; which means
that bilateral protection is more e±cient than bilateral public sponsorship.
However the regions may disagree on harmonization where it would not be
e±cient, and then rules (ii) and (iii) may lead to ine±cient harmonization.
(b) For subject matters in the domain [0;maxf¼ca;¼c wg]h a r m o n i z a t i o n
is less e±cient than unilateral protection, but may nevertheless occur if
~ Da(x) ¸ 0; ~ Dw(x) ¸ 0, and Da(x) < 0;D w(x) < 0: ¤
6 IP without Public Sponsorship
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the economics literature on patent
incentives assumes that the alternative to private investment in R&D is no
investment at all. This assumption may be wrong for two reasons: it does not
re°ect institutions, and it does not assume a benevolent government acting
on behalf of its citizens. However, since it is the premise of most other
investigations of intellectual property rights, I revisit the questions above,
assuming there is no public sector for R&D.
The analysis of e±ciency is much simpler when there are no public sponsors,
since the only alternative to intellectual property is no investment in R&D.
As to intellectual property, since pro¯t is only part of the social bene¯t of
invention, it is never e±cient to stop ¯rms from investing. At best they will
invest up to cost ¼(ca + cw) (since that is the maximum pro¯t available in
the global economy). Without a benevolent public sector, the main problem
is that there will be too little investment, not that it will be funded in the
wrong way. An ine±ciency might also arise through bilateral protection
where unilateral protection would su±ce, as above.
28We shall again consider strategies Pa;P w : R+ !f 0;1g: In order to analyize
equilibrium, I will use functions Wa;W w to represent the value to regions
a and w respectively of providing unilateral protection as opposed to no
protection, and ~ Wa; ~ Ww to represent the value to regions a and w respectively
of providing bilateral protection as opposed to no protection. If, for example,
Wa(x) > 0, then region a as a whole would bene¯t from unilaterally providing
intellectual property protection, but this is only true if, in fact, innovators
can cover the cost x by patenting in region a; which requires in addition that
x · ¼ca:
Wa(x)=mca(°a + °w)+¼°aca ¡ °ax
~ Wa(x)=mca(°a + °w)+¼°a(ca + cw) ¡ °ax
Ww(x)=mcw(°w + °a)+¼°wcw ¡ °wx
~ Ww(x)=mcw(°w + °a)+¼°w(cw + ca) ¡ °wx
First, consider independent choices. The objective function of region a
(symmetrically, w)w i l lb e
­a(Pa(x);Pw(x)) =
Pa(x) £ Wa(x)i f Pw(x)=0 ;x· ¼ca
Pa(x) £ 0i f Pw(x)=0 ;x>¼ c a
Pa(x)i f Pw(x)=1 ;x· ¼cw
£ [¡ca°ad ¡ ca°w(d + ¼)]
Pa(x) £ ~ Wa(x)i f Pw(x)=1 ;
¼(ca + cw) ¸ x>¼ c w
An equilibrium with independent choices (in the absence of public sponsors) is
ap a i r( Pa;P w) such that at each x 2 [0;1];P a(x) 2 arg maxf­a(Pa;Pw(x))jPa 2
f0;1gg and Pw(x) 2 argmaxf­w(Pw;Pa(x))jPw 2f 0;1gg: We again adopt
the convention that if the region is indi®erent between providing protection
or not, it chooses Pi(x) = 0 (does not provide protection).
Equilibrium strategies have some obvious features. For any subject matter
with x 2 [0;minf¼ca;¼c wg); the best response of either region to protec-
29tion by the other region is not to protect it. This is because protection
in a single region is enough to ensure innovation. The nonprotective re-
gion prefers to free-ride, and avoid the deadweight loss of providing addi-
tional protection. On the other hand, the best response to the absence of
protection by the other region is protection, in order to ensure that the in-
novation is undertaken. Thus, one region will protect each subject mat-
ter x 2 [0;minf¼ca;¼c wg); but not both, and it may be indeterminate
which region it will be. Subject matter in the interval [minf¼ca;¼c wg;
maxf¼ca;¼c wg) will be protected by the region that provides the maxi-
mum pro¯t. (In the domain x 2 [0;maxf¼ca;¼c wg); either Wa(x) ¸ 0
or Ww(x) ¸ 0o rb o t h . )
Second, ~ Wa(x); ~ Ww(x) ¸ 0 for every subject matter x 2 [maxf¼ca;¼c wg;
¼(ca+cw)): There are two equilibria for each subject matter in this domain:
Pa(x)=Pw(x)=0a n dPa(x)=Pw(x)=1 : If the other region does
not protect, then there is no incentive to protect. Unilateral protection is
ine®ective, since inventors could not cover their costs. However, if either
region protects the subject matter, then the protection will be reciprocated.
Reciprocity is required for innovation, and innovation enhances welfare in
each region.
Proposition 9 (Independent Choices: Existence and Characterization of
Equilibrium) If public sponsorship is impossible, so that the alternative to
intellectual property is no innovation, then an equilibrium with independent
choices exists and must have the following properties:
(a) For every subject matter x 2 [0;minf¼ca;¼c wg) either Pa(x)=1 , Pw(x)=
0 or vice versa.
(b) For every subject matter x 2 [minf¼ca;¼c wg;maxf¼ca;¼c wg);P a(x)=
1;P w(x)=0if ¼ca >¼ c w and vice versa otherwise.
30(c) For every subject matter x 2 [maxf¼ca;¼c wg;¼(ca +cw)]; either Pa(x)=
Pw(x)=0or Pa(x)=Pw(x)=1 :
(d) For every subject matter x>¼ (ca + cw);P a(x)=Pw(x)=0 :
This shows that, again, the regions' preferences for harmonization will depend
on the alternative equilibrium (Pa;P w).
Proposition 10 [Harmonization] Let (Pa;P w) be an anticipated equilibrium
with independent choices, assuming that the alternative to intellectual prop-
erty is no innovation. Region a (symmetrically, w) prefers to harmonize on
subject matter x if and only if one of the following holds:
(a) x 2 [maxf¼ca;¼c wg);¼(ca + cwg)).
(b) x 2 [0;maxf¼ca;¼c wg)) and Pa(x)=1 ;P w(x)=0 :
Proof: (If) In case (a), harmonized protection is required for investment,
and ~ Wa(x) ¸ 0: In case (b), the alternative to harmonized protection is
unilateral protection by one region or the other. If region w provides the
protection, region a can free-ride and does not want to harmonize. If the
protection will be provided by region a,t h e na would prefer bilateral protec-
tion in order to recoup some of its costs by earning proprietary pro¯t abroad
( ~ Wa(x) >W a(x)):
(Only If) If (a) does not hold and (b) does not hold, then x 2 [0;maxf¼ca;¼c wg))
and Pa(x)=0 ;P w(x) = 1 (since the other cases are excluded by Proposition
9). But then a does not prefer harmonization, since it can free ride on w. ¤
As when the alternative to intellectual property is public sponsorship, at
most one region will protect the relatively low-cost inventions, and the regions
31will have opposed incentives as to harmonization on those subject matters.
Their incentives are more aligned for high-cost inventions, for which bilateral
protection is necessary to be e®ective.
As before, de¯ne a most protective equilibrium as one, without public spon-
sors, in which every subject matter x 2 [maxf¼ca;¼c wg;¼(ca + cw)] is pro-
tected in both jurisdictions, and each subject matter with x 2 [0;maxf¼ca;¼c wg]
is protected by a single jurisdiction. In Proposition 11, when we say that
the regions anticipate a particular equilibrium with independent choices, we
again mean with respect to those subject matters for which there has been
no agreement to harmonize.
We can consider the same three rules for resolving disputes that are men-
tioned above: the Nonprotectionist Rule, the Protectionist Rule and the
Bargaining Solution. The following proposition is again somewhat obvious,
but I record it for completeness.
Proposition 11 (Comparison of Independent andHarmonized Choices) Sup-
pose that there is no public R&D sector. Then harmonized protections will
extend to more subject matter than independently chosen protections, except
possibly in the most protective equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
Economic theories about the optimal design of intellectual property involve a
balancing of consumer losses due to proprietary pricing against ¯rms' incen-
tives to invent, and (in this paper) against alternative ways to fund R&D,
such as public sponsorship. The policy prescriptions suggested by such a
32calculus are not implemented in a fragmented world connected by trade.
National policies in a fragmented world create uncompensated externalities
among countries.
In a purely domestic calculation, introducing public sponsorship as a viable
alternative to intellectual property would reduce reliance on private incen-
tives as a source of R&D. This e®ect is muted in the international arena,
where the bene¯ts to foreigners of domestically sponsored R&D cannot be re-
couped through proprietary pricing. In contrast, intellectual property allows
some of the bene¯ts to be repatriated.
These arguments suggest that policy makers in a trade context will be more in
favor of intellectual property than domestic interests would otherwise war-
rant. However there is an o®setting di±culty. There is a coordination
problem in setting intellectual property policy. Some subject matters are
costly enough, especially in a trading context with many small nations, that
only multilateral protection of the subject matter is e®ective. A situation
could arise where no country protects a subject matter because no other
country protects it. Such subject matters would therefore have to be sup-
ported by public sponsors, whether or not that public sponsorship is more
e±cient than private incentives. Negotiations to harmonize intellectual prop-
erty protection can solve this coordination problem.
On the other hand, harmonization can lead to multilateral protections where
unilateral protections would su±ce. For some subject matters, costs are low
enough that protection in a single country, usually a large market, is enough
to support private innovations, including private innovation in countries that
do not protect the subject matter. Even though it may be e±cient, the
asymmetry creates international tension.
33One of the main points illuminated here is that, although harmonization can
increase private investment in R&D in order to collect pro¯t in foreign mar-
kets, it does not similarly stimulate the public sector. For subject matters
not entrusted to the private sector, there may be too little R&D investment.
If the only remedy is harmonization on intellectual property rights, then we
would expect to see an expansion in intellectual property rights. However a
better remedy might be international agreements on public spending. But
although there are institutions to negotiate and implement harmonized in-
tellectual property policies, there are no institutions to coordinate public
spending to be put in the public domain.
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